Owing to the dynamic development of the Internet and information technology, user can now access information and services provided by remote service provider through the Internet. The Internet is an open medium of communication; hence, in order to ensure private communication, this study designs an "anonymous user identification protocol" to determine user identities, as well as negotiating a private key for information encryption to prevent unauthorized user from accessing the communication data. Previous similar protocols employed timestamps to prevent replay attacks, requiring both sides of the communication to synchronize their clocks and causing a considerable burden on distributed systems. This study uses random numbers instead of synchronized clocks to prevent replay attacks, and thus reduces system construction and maintenance costs, besides being more applicable in distributed computer network systems. User identification has been reduced from four rounds of communications to three, providing evidence for the improvement in recognition efficiency and more effective bandwidth management.
Introduction
With the vigorous development of network technology and the rising popularity of the Internet, the use of e-commerce related services has become prevalent. In the distributed network environment, it is crucial to secure communications that take place over an insecure channel. User identification and private key distribution are therefore crucial components in a distributed network environment.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [6] pioneered the concept of public-key cryptography. The main purpose of the key exchange system is that when two entities want to conduct communications through the Internet, both participants can obtain a shared key through modular exponentiation to ensure the security of communication; this security is established based on the solution of the Diffie-Hellman problem. However, this protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, because, the transmission end and receiving end do not undergo user identification prior to the communication, and the attacker can easily impersonate one of the roles to deceive either party.
Lee and Chang proposed an anonymous user identification scheme [8] in 2000. Their scheme provides user identification and key exchange simultaneously while protecting user's personal information from disclosing. As indicated by Wu and Hsu [13] , there are security leaks in scheme [8] . Due to one-way authentication, an attacker can masquerade as the service provider and share a session key with the user. Also with compromised session key, enables an attacker 
The registration phase
First, user (or service provider) must send their identity information ID i to a trusted third party for registration; afterward, the trusted third party uses a private key d to calculate S i = ID d i mod N and sends S i to the user (or the service provider) for future identity validation purposes. The communication processes in the registration phase are all transmitted through secure channels as shown in Fig. 1 : Fig. 1 The registration phase in Hsu and Chuang's scheme
The user identification phase
In this phase, if the user requires access to the services provided by service provider, they must first reach consensus with the service provider in the form of a shared key and mutual authentication. The communication processes are shown in Fig. 2 : Fig. 2 The user identification phase in Hsu and Chuang's scheme
Step 1
First, the user must send a service request to the service provider.
Step 2
Once the service provider receives the user service request, it will select a random number k from 
Discussion
This section will address the security loopholes that can be found in the scheme proposed by Hsu and Chuang, as well as suggesting methods that can be used to attack these deficiencies. The following section shows that the attacker can calculate the secret parameters S i of the user after intercepting public information (w, x, y, T) multiple times and the corresponding session keys. The process is described as follows:
Common modulus attack
One of the most common attacks on RSA cryptosystem is common modulus attack [4, 11] . 5 Assume that (e, n) and (f, n) are two RSA public keys. 
reflects a word string of up to l bits; therefore, the number reflected by ) ( h should not exceed . As a result, the probability of 1 h being a prime number is at least , and the probability of 1 h and 2 h being co-primes is at least ; therefore the probability of ) , (
Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, the integer coefficients a and b are derived such that 1
is derived from the equations of x 1 and x 2 . In this way, if both session keys K ij 1 and K ij 2 are compromised, the attacker can derive the secret parameter i S of legitimate user with probability at least 1/160 2 . Thus allowing the attacker to impersonate a legitimate user to deceive the service provider and obtain the related services.
In the case of insider attack, namely, the attacker is a malicious service provider; the result may be lethal since attacker knows every session's session key. Assume that the attacker has collected messages x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , h 1 , h 2 , and h 3 , where gcd(h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) = 1. By iterative application of extended Euclidean algorithm, there exists three integer coefficients a, b, and c such that
. Since the probability gcd(h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) = 1 is greater than that gcd(h 1 , h 2 ) = 1, therefore the insider attack speeds up computing the secret token of legitimate user.
Our protocol
In this article, the authors use the Diffie-Hellman public key technique to ensure the security of the protocol and achieve mutual authentication through the shared key used by both user and service provider. Therefore, it would hinder attackers should they attempt to obtain a legitimate shared key by using the public information available, because they would first have to solve the Diffie-Hellman mathematical problem.
The proposed scheme of the system operation is divided into three phases: 1. the system 6 setup phase; 2. the registration phase; and 3. the user identification phase. The participants in the protocol include the user U i , the service provider P j and the trusted third-party SCPC. The system setup parameters and notations are similar to those in Hsu and Chuang's protocol. The registration phase and user identification phase are described in the following section.
The registration phase
The procedure of registration is almost the same as the scheme of Hsu and Chuang [7] except the value of ID i is assigned by SCPC rather than selected by user (or service provider). This will resist the attack of computing secret token as demonstrated in Section 5 and literature [15] . Namely, during the registration procedures, user (or service provider) sends a request of registration to SCPC. After accepting the request, SCPC sends user a secret token S i = (ID i ) d mod N and ID i with a secure channel to complete the registration.
The user identification phase
In this phase, if the user wants to obtain access to the services provided by the service provider, both parties must first undergo mutual authentication before jointly generating a shared key,
. The communication process is detailed in this section and illustrated in Fig. 3 : Fig. 3 The user identification phase
The user selects a random number k from to the service provider.
Step 2
The service provider selects a random number j k from * N Z and generates a session key Step 3
Once the user receives the message ) , ( to the service provider.
Step 4
After the service provider receives the message ) , , ( 
Security analysis
Some attacks on the previous schemes related to anonymous user identification have been suggested on literatures [7-8, 10, 13-15] . Literature [3] lists some desirable security attributes for authenticated key agreement protocols such as known-key security, full forward secrecy (perfect forward secrecy), and key-compromise impersonation. This section analyzes whether the above-mentioned attacks would similarly pose a threat to our proposed scheme, and reviews some of the common forms of attack and security requirements. 8 
Common modulus attack
If an attacker attempts to perform a common modulus attack to decipher the user private parameter i S based on the intercepted messages ) , , ( 
Replay attack
If an attacker intercepts legitimate messages ) , , (
 exchanged between the user and the service provider during their communication sessions and attempts a replay attack on a subsequent communication session, it would prove to be difficult. In each communication session, both the user and the service provider generate different sets of random numbers i k and j k and thus produce a different shared session key for every session. Therefore, the attacker will not be able to impersonate any of the user or service provider in any communication session based on previously intercepted messages. Based on this condition, our protocol is capable of resisting replay attacks.
Forgery attack and Mutual authentication
If an attacker attempts to forge the service provider legitimate message ) , ( . Therefore the proposed scheme can withstand the attacks described in Wu and Hsu [13] . It would also be impossible for the attacker to attempt to forge the user legitimate message ) , , (
for misleading the service provider, because the attacker would similarly be unable to obtain the user private parameter i S . Therefore, the attacker would similarly be unable to calculate the corresponding user data used for the authentication equation ) , , , , , , ( ?
As discussed above, user and service provider authenticate the validity of each other, the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication.
User anonymity
Using passwords selected from a collection of small space, an attacker might enumerate all possible passwords. The enumeration can be done offline. Ultimately, the attacker may get the correct password. It is called dictionary attack or password-guessing attack [1] [2] . Since the space of identity is small, Hsu and Chuang [7] proposed a dictionary attack on schemes [10, 14] to disclose the identity of user. By searching an identity ID i to satisfy w  (ID i ) h(w, T) = x e mod N, a victim user is identified, where e, N, T, w, and x are publicly available. To protect user's identity from revealing, the proposed scheme uses shared key to encrypt the identity of users and session key to verify the authenticity of messages.
That is, identities of legitimate user are not immediately apparent from the publicly 9 available information, because user encrypt their identity information using shared key K M and generate the anonymous identity data )
. Only legitimate service provider know the corresponding shared key K M , which is used to decrypt the anonymous identity information and obtain access to the user true identity,
, session key K ij is required in order to prevent dictionary attack. Therefore, the lack of the shared key K M and session key K ij can be equated with an inability to calculate the user true identity.
Computing user's secret token
User mixed random numbers, public information, and secret token S i to form messages transmitted from user to server, in order to provide a way to verify the authenticity of the messages. Literature [14] shows that the service provider in scheme [13] can compute user's secret token, once the user completed a successful login procedure. In the proposed scheme, the mixed message is By mathematical computation, an attacker may compute the secret token of another user, as demonstrated in Literature [15] . Suppose an attacker ID a has selected a victim user ID v . Then the attacker computes identity ID a = 1 / ID v mod N. After registration phase, the attacker will get secret token S a = (ID a ) d mod N. With the value S a , the attacker can compute the secret token S v = 1 / S a mod N and impersonate ID v as well. This method is effective to attack all the schemes in [7-8, 10, 13-14] . The proposed scheme restrains user and service provider from freely choosing their ID i . Thus prevents malicious user from launching attack to compute other user's secret token.
Known-key security
In this protocol, the establishment of a session key protects the message exchange between the user and the service provider. The shared key
is generated by random numbers (k i , k j ); a different set of random numbers (k i , k j ) is generated for every communication session. In this way, even if an attacker were able to intercept the session key in one session, it still cannot be used to decipher the contents of a previous communication session. Namely, a compromised session key does not leak information of other session keys.
Man-in-the-middle attack
It is difficult for attackers to replace information ) , ( 
. Messages with legitimate authentication codes are can only be sent by legitimate users. In this manner, cross validation mechanisms can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Perfect forward secrecy
According to the protocol established in this study, the session key
used on both the server side and user side is composed of random numbers k i and k j , which means that the session key generated for each communication run is different. Learning the quantities of Z i and Z j cannot benefit attacker to compute the session key K ij , since the hardness of Diffie-Hellman problem. Even if the long-term private keys of both parties, S i and S j are inadvertently acquired by a third party, the previously generated session keys K ij would not be compromised.
Denial-of-service attack (DoS)
Denial-of-Service attack is an attempt to make service provider (server) unavailable to legitimate registered users. Shu and Chuang [7] and Magipudi and Katti [10] indicated that the scheme proposed in [14] suffers from denial-of-service attack since the user end does not verify the authenticity of received messages. During user identification phase (login phase), an attacker simply modifies the messages sending to the user end will cause the server to deny the request of providing service. By the same rationale, the schemes in literatures [8, 13, 15] all have the same weakness. The proposed scheme verifies the authenticity of messages received from server by executing the authentication equation, * The scheme depicted in Fig. 4 of literature [7] can't withstand the attack of Denial-of-Service attack. However, Hsu and Chuang [7] remedied this weakness by adding a digital signature on Z, as described in subsection 4.5. Table 1 summarizes comparison of security analysis of the proposed scheme and previous schemes. In viewing Table 1 , an entry Failure/Success implies an adversary will fail/succeed to launch attack; No/Yes indicates the possession of the corresponding attribute. For example, in the row "User anonymity", only scheme Hsu-Chuang [7] and our scheme preserve attribute of user anonymity as explained in subsection 5.4; in the row "Replay attack", the adversary will fail to mount replay attack on any scheme; in the row "Computing user's secret token", the adversary will succeed to compute user's secret token in all schemes except our scheme.
Discussion
Some previous schemes related to anonymous user identification and key distribution have been mentioned on the study. This section will discuss performance evaluation of these schemes as well as our proposed scheme, according to communication rounds, communication cost, and computational complexity. For easy of comparison, the following notation is defined firstly.
T [7-8, 10, 13-14] . The scheme in [15] is absent from Tables, since it only modifies the registration phase of schemes in [13] [14] and the modified schemes have the same performance as the original schemes. Table 2 summarizes computational requirements of each scheme. Since resistant to denial-of-service attack may require more computation, we discuss only those schemes with this attribute, i.e. schemes [7] b , [10] , and our scheme. Also, the discussion is in terms of the modular exponentiation computation T exp , since it is the heaviest burden of computation. In the user end, the proposed scheme executes five times of T exp . Schemes [7] b and [10] execute six and seven times of T exp . For the server end, our scheme, schemes [7] b and [10] execute four, five, and five times of T exp , respectively. Therefore, the proposed scheme outperforms schemes [7] b and [10] in terms of computational complexities. Table 3 lists a summary on communication rounds and communication cost. As for the communication rounds, all schemes (includes our scheme) require three rounds, except scheme [7] . For convenient comparison on communication cost, consider a practical parameter setting of cryptosystem.
Under Level 4 security concerns [9, 15] , the key length is 80 bits for symmetric key encryption and 1248 bits for asymmetric key encryption, the bit length of hashed values is 160. Also to secure against guessing identity attack as described in subsection 5.4, the string ID i must have enough bit length. Therefore, we have |N| = 1248, |ID i | = 160, |MAC| = 160, and |T| = 48. As listed in Table 3 , among the schemes [7] b , [10] , and our scheme, secure against denial-of-service attack, our scheme requires least bit size. It saves at least about 20% of the 12 communication bits. Also, only the scheme proposed in the study requires no system wide timestamp. This will decrease the costs of construction and maintenance, and make it more applicable in distributed network environment. Table 2 . Computational complexities of the proposed scheme and previous schemes a As described in Fig. 4 of literature [7] , it is incapable of resisting to Denial-of-Service attack. b Hsu and Chuang's improvement on scheme a , it can withstand the attack of Denial-of-Service. Table 3 . Communicational cost of the proposed scheme and previous schemes a and b are the same as that in Table 2 .
Conclusion
In this article, we found that the scheme proposed by Hsu and Chuang is vulnerable to common modulus attacks; an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user to gain access to the services provided by service provider. In order to solve the problems present in Hsu and Chuang's scheme, the authors proposed an anonymous user identification and key distribution technical protocol that is resistant to common modulus attacks.
Additionally, in the proposed scheme, mutual authentication can be achieved in only three rounds of communication sessions, which is one round less than that in Hsu and Chuang's scheme. In a distributed network, the focus is mainly on the number of communications; hence, if the number of communications is reduced, the time spent waiting for a response can be shortened. This reduction shortens the amount of time that user and service provider spend on authentication. Meanwhile, costs can be reduced through improvements in the hardware. In this manner, with the application of this protocol in a distributed network, our program is comparatively more efficient. Additionally, the authentication protocol eliminates the use of timestamps to avoid the inconvenience of using synchronized clocks across distributed systems. This amendment makes the proposed scheme more suitable for distributed computer network
